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INTRODUCTION

We live in an age of convenience. From financial transactions
to electronic correspondence, we frequently deal with large
corporations that provide services in our daily lives. One of the prices
we pay for the convenience of these transactions, however, is that our
commercial relationships increasingly are based on standard form
contracts written by large corporations. While these standard form
contracts are necessary to an economically efficient society, the
growing use of mandatory arbitration provisions and clauses that
prohibit class actions in these contracts raises the spectre of corporate
abuse.
This reality of modern commercial life brings into conflict two
particular trends in the civil justice system: increased acceptance of
mandatory arbitration clauses and more frequent use of the class
action device as a means to vindicate individual claims.1 Both the
class action and the arbitration device are exceptions to more general
rules: the arbitration device is an exception to the general rule that
disputes between parties are resolved in courts of law, and the class
action device is "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is
2
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only."
Corporations faced with the prospect of an enormous number of
claims arising out of their frequent transactions with consumers have
increasingly sought to channel such claims to arbitration, while at the
1.
As a preliminary matter, arbitration removes disputes from the judicial system and
places them in a private system of justice that is paid for by the participants in the dispute.
Provisions prohibiting class actions (referred to throughout as "class action waivers") work in
conjunction with standard arbitration clauses to ensure that any claim brought against the
drafter may only be asserted in a one-on-one, non-aggregated arbitral proceeding. Myriam Gilles,
Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104
MICH. L. REV. 373, 376 (2005).
2.
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979).
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same time denying claimants the right to proceed through class
actions. The confluence of mandatory arbitration and class action
waivers is particularly problematic for "negative-value claims" 3 where
the expected recovery does not justify the cost of a stand-alone claim,
and where, as a result, corporations have the greatest incentive to
write class action waivers into mandatory arbitration provisions. 4 For
example, imagine you are the victim of a fraudulent scheme by a
credit-card company to charge fees that are higher than advertised.
You suddenly discover that not only are you unable to bring your
claims in court, but also your individual expected recovery (the
difference between the advertised fee and the charged fee) is too low to
justify an attorney's time and expense. Unless you can aggregate your
claims with those of others, you may have no effective recourse to
vindicate your claims.
Faced with problems such as this, plaintiffs' lawyers have
raised various challenges to mandatory class action waivers.
Prominent among these challenges is that class action waivers in
contracts of adhesion are unenforceable under state-law doctrines of
unconscionability. This strategy has met with some success, as a few
state courts have used the unconscionability doctrine to solve the
problem of class action waivers in adhesion contracts. On the whole,
however, the unconscionability doctrine has had limited effectiveness
in addressing the core problem created by class action waivers in
adhesion contracts, namely, that there may be a sufficiently close
nexus between the class action waiver and non-waivable substantive
rights such that these waivers should not be left to private bargaining.
This Note urges a re-examination of the issue of class action
waivers, and suggests that courts should take a new approach to the
problem posed by such waivers. Rather than rely on a patchwork of
state-law unconscionability doctrine, courts should adopt a federal
standard under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") that would
guarantee that arbitration agreements do not thwart the vindication
of substantive rights. Part I of this Note briefly outlines the rise of
judicial acceptance of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism in
general, and of adhesion contracts as a vehicle for requiring

A negative-value suit is one in which the total costs of pursuing the claim exceed the
3.
total expected recovery for that claim.
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) ("The policy at the very
4.
core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not
provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A
class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into
something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor.") (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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arbitration in particular. Part I also surveys the principal criticisms of
mandatory arbitration agreements. Part II discusses how companies
have used class action waiver provisions in mandatory arbitration
agreements in an effort to reduce or eliminate aggregated procedures.
Part III discusses the effort by some litigants and courts to use the
doctrine of unconscionability as a possible sword against these class
action waivers. Part III contends, however, that the unconscionability
doctrine is an imperfect tool for this task in that it fails to capture the
core concerns attendant to class action waivers.
Finally, Part IV advocates a new approach. First, it examines
the two fundamental premises underlying the FAA's pro-arbitration
policy: the assumptions that (1) arbitration does not fundamentally
thwart or alter substantive rights, but merely transfers dispute
resolution to an alternative forum, and (2) arbitration allows parties
to decide on mutually beneficial procedures for resolving disputes over
those rights. Part IV argues that, in the context of mandatory
arbitration, class action waivers in certain contexts (namely, negativevalue suits) violate these assumptions in that they prevent plaintiffs
from effectively vindicating their substantive rights. Picking up on the
Supreme Court's dicta in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc.,5 and its more recent decision in Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Randolph,6 Part IV argues that the implicit assumptions
underlying the FAA's liberal pro-arbitration policy warrant
invalidation of class waivers in cases where they effectively preclude
the vindication of these rights. Part IV concludes by proposing a twostep inquiry for determining whether or not a class action waiver
should be enforced under this new federal standard.
I. THE FAA's POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION: ORIGINS, PREMISES, AND
IMPLICATIONS

Since the early part of the twentieth century, scholars, judges,
attorneys, and litigants on both sides of the adversarial system have
criticized the civil litigation process as unduly cumbersome, expensive,
and time-consuming.7 In response, many participants in the litigation
5.

473 U.S. 614 (1985).

6.
531 U.S. 79 (2000).
7.
See, e.g., Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1118-19 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating
that many critics of civil litigation appeals favor arbitration as an alternative); C. Evan Stewart,
Securities Arbitration Appeal: An Oxymoron No Longer?, 79 KY. L.J. 347, 347 n.3 (1991) (noting
that many view the civil litigation system as "too cumbersome, burdensome, time-consuming,
formalistic, and expensive" and promote arbitration as an alternative); Warren E. Burger, Isn't
there a Better Way?, reprinted in LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE

RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 13-15 (2d ed. 1997) (describing the adversarial system as expensive
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process have viewed alternative dispute resolutions, such as private
arbitration, as an efficient, cost-effective, and specialized alternative
to formal, public litigation. Arbitration in particular is viewed as
having a number of advantages. Because arbitration allows the
parties to develop flexible procedures, 8 it often moves more swiftly
than civil litigation actions. In addition, since arbitrators rarely
publish their opinions, the time between hearing and result is shorter
in arbitration than in standard litigation. 9 Further, many scholars
extol arbitration as a desirable alternative to litigation because it
allows disputants to select a decision maker with particular expertise
and to design a dispute resolution process that is best suited to the
parties' needs. 10
Despite these perceived benefits, arbitration agreements
initially received a hostile reception from most federal courts. 1 In
1925, Congress passed the FAA to reverse this "hostility to
arbitration."1 2 Section 2 of the FAA ensures that parties' agreements
to arbitration will be enforced in federal court, stating that written
arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
13
of any contract."

and time-consuming; asserting that "[w]e need to consider moving some cases from the adversary
system to administrative processes . . . especially arbitration"); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal ArbitrationAct, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931,
934 (1999) (noting that the growth of consumer arbitration stemmed largely from "widespread
dissatisfaction with the civil justice system").
8.
Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1, 40 (2005). For
example, arbitration proceedings need not follow the rules of evidence, and many arbitrators
limit or even eliminate discovery. Id.
9.
Id. at 41.
10. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 22 (2000); see also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERT ET
AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION AND OTHER PROCESSES 234 (3d ed. 1999)

(noting the theoretical advantages of arbitration); Warren E. Burger, Using Arbitration to
Achieve Justice, ARB. J., Dec. 1985, at 3, 6 ("[I]n terms of cost, time and human wear and tear,
arbitration is vastly better than conventional litigation for many kinds of cases."); Dwight
Golann, Developments in Consumer Financial Services Litigation, 32 BUS. LAW. 1081, 1091
(1988) (contending that arbitration is potentially quicker, less expensive, and more private for all
parties).
11. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 981-84 (2d Cir. 1942)
(holding that mandatory arbitration agreement was revocable at the will of either party); U.S.
Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (same).
12. Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic
Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 214 (2000).
13. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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A. The Rise of Mandatory14 ArbitrationAgreements
At the time of the passage of the FAA, U.S. businesses typically
did not use arbitration agreements to require consumers, employees,
franchisees, or other parties in weaker bargaining positions to resolve
disputes through private arbitration. 15 Instead, the early use of
arbitration was generally limited to contracts between businesses or
between management and unions. 16 In fact, when the FAA was
debated in Congress, one Senator expressed concern that arbitration
contracts might be "offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive
customers or employees," but was assured by the bill's supporters that
they did not intend the FAA to cover such situations. 17 Early Supreme
Court jurisprudence also seemed to assuage fears that it would enforce
adhesive arbitration agreements against consumers. For example, in
its 1953 decision in Wilko v. Swan,18 the Supreme Court refused to
apply an arbitration clause to claims of securities fraud, interpreting
the Securities Act of 1933 to prohibit the use of such a provision and
emphasizing that the FAA "was drafted with an eye to the
disadvantages under which buyers labor." 19
In the 1980s, however, the Court's view towards commercial
arbitration changed dramatically. In 1983, the Court first articulated
its oft-cited holding that the FAA evidences a "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding
any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary." 20 Six years later, in
1989, the Supreme Court reversed its prior decision in Wilko and
required courts to enforce arbitration agreements written by securities
brokerage houses against investors. 21 In 1991, the Court in Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.22 held that a securities broker could be
14. When this paper uses the term "mandatory" it refers only to the former meaning, which
equates "mandatory" arbitration agreements with those found in contracts of adhesion; that is,
standard form contracts offered to individuals on a "take it or leave it" basis.
15. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 7, 19 (1992).

16.

See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.

1631, 1636 (2005).

17. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary,67th Cong. 9-11 (1923)).
18. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
19. Id. at 435, 436 (noting that arbitration does not offer the same remedies as litigation;
pointing out that arbitrators may make awards "without explanation of their reasons and
without a complete record of their proceedings").
20. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
21. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
22. 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).
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forced to arbitrate his federal age discrimination claims against his
23
employer.
As judicial support of arbitration as a means of commercial
dispute resolution grew, U.S. businesses quickly began imposing
arbitration in contexts previously thought to prohibit the use of such a
method of dispute resolution. U.S. corporations increasingly used form
24 and the like 25 to
contracts, mail inserts, shrink-wrap licenses,
require consumers, employees, patients, and others to resolve future
26
claims through arbitration rather than through the courts.
Numerous reported cases evidence the increased use of mandatory
28
27
arbitration by entities including financial institutions, retailers,
service providers, 29 and even McDonald's restaurants in their
30
promotional games.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997).
25. The actual form of arbitration clauses also has changed substantially during the last
twenty years. While the FAA mandates that arbitration agreements be written, it does not
require that they be signed to be enforceable. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler,
"Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's
Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 55 (focusing on industries that
provided what the authors deemed "important purchases" (e.g. transactions that were expensive,
such as automobile purchases), ongoing (e.g. long distance telephone service), or that had
potentially large social impacts (e.g. health care services) and noting that, unsurprisingly, these
industries began including arbitration agreements in documents that, while sent to consumers,
were not of the types usually read or signed). U.S. businesses have included arbitration
agreements in small print notices sent to consumers already bound to contracts, in envelope
stuffers, see, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding unconscionable an
arbitration clause imposed on telephone consumers via envelope stuffers), in warranties
contained in boxes, see Hill, 105 F.3d at 1151 (upholding an arbitration clause imposed upon
consumers via a warranty brochure in the computer box), on Web sites, see, e.g., Dell Inc., Dell's
Online Policies: U.S. Terms & Conditions of Sale, at http://www.dell.com/content/topics/global.
aspx/policy/en/policy?c=us&l=en&s=gen&~section=012 (last visited Sept. 2, 2006); Gateway,
Inc., Gateway Consumer Service Plans, at http://content.gateway.com/www.gateway.com
about/legal/warranties/8510306ConVAS88757B_306.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2006), and in e-mail
communications, see, e.g., Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142, 149
(D. Mass. 2004) (finding e-mail notification insufficient to require employee to resolve disputes in
binding arbitration).
26. See Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1631 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has
approved and even encouraged U.S. companies to use various forms of contracts to bind
consumers and the like to binding arbitration).
27. See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Fin. Group v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding
an arbitration clause imposed on illiterate consumer borrower); McKenzie Check Advance of
Miss. v. Hardy, 866 So. 2d 446, 455 (Miss. 2004) (upholding arbitration clause imposed on
payday-loan borrowers).
28. See, e.g., Hill, 105 F.3d at 1151 (upholding arbitration clause imposed on computer
purchasers by including arbitration provision in warranty brochure in computer box); Cavalier
Mfg., Inc. v. Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634, 636-37 (Ala. 2003) (upholding arbitration clause imposed on
mobile home purchasers).
29. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995) (upholding
arbitration clause imposed on consumer purchasing termite extermination services); Carbajal v.
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U.S. companies not only increased their usage of arbitration
agreements to compel arbitration, but they also began using these
agreements to dictate various characteristics of the arbitration
process. For example, businesses have used arbitration agreements in
an
effort-sometimes
successfully-to
shorten
statutes
of
limitations,3 1 restrict or eliminate discovery,3 2 require a claimant to
file in a particular and perhaps distant forum, 33 bar consumers or
employees from recovering particular forms of relief, 34 and, through
the use of class action waivers, prohibit consumers, employees, or
35
other plaintiffs from joining together in a class action.
B. A Critiqueof MandatoryArbitration Agreements
The emergence of mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts of
adhesion is subject to significant criticism. Many critics of mandatory
arbitration agreements assert that such clauses are inherently
"unfair" to individuals for the simple reason that the party upon whom
an arbitration clause is imposed is
unwilling or unable to resist .... In some cases this will stem from lack of knowledge of
what is happening until it is too late. But in most cases it will also be a function of the
market power of the stronger party, imposing its will on the weaker one: an ordinary

H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc. 372 F.3d 903, 905-06 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding arbitration clause
imposed on person who obtained tax preparation services, noting that unconscionability
arguments are inappropriate where arbitration is selected "voluntarily").
30. Popovich v. McDonald's Corp., 189 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777-78 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
31. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (invaliding
an employment clause that imposed a shortened statue of limitations on employees); Stirlen v.
Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding shortened time limit
unconscionable).
32. Generally, arbitration clauses leave discovery to the arbitrator's discretion, but it is
well-recognized that discovery is less available in arbitration than in litigation. Sternlight, supra
note 16, at 1641 n.51. A few courts have held unenforceable arbitration clauses that unduly limit
access to essential documents and witnesses. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 684 (Cal. 2000).
33. See, e.g., Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565-66 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (refusing to enforce an arbitration clause imposed by a financing organization upon
California consumers that required arbitration to be heard in Minneapolis, noting that, though
such a procedure might be fair if applied to a business entity, it was not necessarily just when
applied to consumers); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571-75 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998) (finding unconscionable an arbitration agreement that required nationwide consumers to
arbitrate claims in Chicago).
34. See, e.g., Circuit City, 279 F.3d at 893 (finding unconscionable an arbitration provision
imposed on employees in part because it limited the amount of damages and front and back pay);
Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 733 (Ala. 2002) (holding an arbitration clause unconscionable
to the extent it prevented consumers' right to recover punitive damages).
35. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court (Discover Bank), 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal.
2005); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).

2006]

BEYOND UNCONSCIONABILITY

1743

employee, a health-care patient, a consumer of goods or services, a small business
36
dealing with a large one.

As one scholar has written, "Under the law written by the
Court, birds of prey will sup on workers, consumers, shippers,
'3 7
passengers and franchisees.
Critics further argue that mandatory arbitration agreements
are manifestly "unfair" because businesses frequently use them to
dictate particular details of potential arbitral disputes. 38 In the
context of adhesive contracts, the parties have not genuinely
bargained for these details; rather, the drafter often has imposed its
choices upon the party with weaker bargaining power, the individual
consumer or employee. Not surprisingly, these "detail" clauses are
typically drafted in a one-sided manner favoring the drafter-usually
a corporation or union-without any input or negotiation by the
individual consumers or employees. The typical one-sidedness of these
"detail" provisions is especially troublesome in light of one of the
primary arguments articulated in favor of private arbitration: it
allows parties to tailor the arbitration proceedings to the individual
needs and wants of each party. Further, many argue that these
"detail" provisions limit or eliminate individuals' procedural and
substantive rights. For example, because state and federal courts have
reached differing results regarding the enforceability of class action
waivers, various detail provisions, such as choice-of-law or choice-offorum provisions, can affect, among other things, an individual's
ability to take advantage of aggregation procedures. 39 Other
procedural aspects of mandatory arbitration have also generated
criticism. For example, arbitration does not typically provide a right to
appeal, and review of arbitral awards by courts is limited under the
FAA to grounds of corruption, fraud, "evident partiality," misconduct,
40
and actions that are ultra vires.
Consumer and employee advocates in particular have launched
specific criticisms of mandatory arbitration agreements. Both contend
that arbitration, though lauded as more cost-effective than standard
36. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 788 (2002).
37. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
331,401.
38. Examples of such "detail" clauses include, but are not limited to, those ordering the use
of a particular arbitrator, those limiting or restricting discovery, those requiring a claimant to
file in a particular-and perhaps distant-forum, those setting forth the substantive law to be
employed, and those barring individuals from joining together in a class action.
39. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court (Discover Bank Remand), 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d
456, 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
40. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
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litigation, is in truth unavailable to many individuals because its
initial costs are prohibitively high. 41 Criticizing the enforcement of
arbitration clauses in employment contracts, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") announced in a policy statement
that agreements requiring employees to agree to binding arbitration of
discrimination claims as a condition of employment are "contrary to
fundamental principles" of American employment discrimination
laws. 42 These criticisms of mandatory arbitration agreements are
especially relevant to the analysis of class action waivers because
many employment claims-particularly those alleging patterns or
practices of discrimination and requesting primarily injunctive
relief-are most effectively brought as class actions.
Despite these criticisms, mandatory arbitration agreements
also have their supporters. Many assert that binding arbitration
provides a better alternative for consumers than does standard
litigation. 43 These supporters contend that arbitration provisions help
consumers and employees by giving them a forum that is at least

41. Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
133, 133 (2004). Unlike litigation, parties to arbitration must pay the fees of the arbitrator and of
the administering institution. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS.
L. REV. 33, 61 (1997) (stating that "[h]igher threshold costs to plaintiff' is a reason "why
corporate defendants like arbitration"). In addition, a party who brings a claim in arbitration
must pay an up-front fee that typically exceeds the filing fee required to proceed in court. See
Frederick L. Miller, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Building Barriersto Consumer
Protection, 78 MICH. B.J. 302, 303 (1999) (discussing various fees associated with arbitral
proceedings). It is worth noting, however, that up-front arbitration fees are often tempered by
low-cost consumer arbitration, see Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair"Arbitration Clauses, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 713 n.141, and the willingness of some arbitral institutions to waive or
reduce fees for indigent claimants. See NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE

http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/2006O501CodeOf
45,
available at
RULE
Procedure07216.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2006) (waiver of fees for indigent party). In fact, various
courts have recognized that the costs of arbitration can indeed prevent consumers from using the
very forum that an arbitration agreement has made the exclusive means of resolving their
claims. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that consumer
complainants would face insurmountable arbitration costs if forced to bring their small claims
individually); Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594, 605 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that prohibitive costs may "render the arbitral forum inaccessible"); Brower v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding unconscionable a provision
requiring arbitration of consumer disputes over computer purchases because the chosen arbitral
forum-the International Chamber of Commerce-had a minimum up-front fee of $4000 for small
claims, stating that excessive costs "deter consumers from invoking arbitration").
42. EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July 10, 1997).
43. See Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1633; see also David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of
Mandatory Arbitration in Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bathwater,
and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 147 (1999) (stating
that whatever disadvantages involved with mandatory arbitration, they are minimal compared
to those involved in litigation).
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arguably less expensive and usually more efficient and accessible. 44
Indeed, supporters of mandatory arbitration agreements, though
acknowledging their imperfections, argue that as long as certain
procedural guarantees are provided, these agreements "level the
playing field" because they provide an adjudicatory process for
plaintiffs who likely would-in the context of standard litigation-be
forced to settle for paltry sums or receive no relief whatsoever. 45
Further, many argue that because arbitration often reduces the
drafter's own dispute resolution costs, market forces ensure that these
savings are passed to consumers in the form of lower prices and to
employees in the form of higher wages. 46 As a fundamental matter,
some supporters of binding arbitration insist that voiding these
contracts would effectively deny consumers and employees their
47
freedom of contract.
II. CLASS ACTION WAIVERS IN MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The problem of possible unfairness caused by mandatory
arbitration clauses has been exacerbated by another recent trend: the
increasing use by many U.S. businesses of mandatory arbitration
provisions that prohibit class-wide proceedings, referred to throughout
this Note as "class action waivers." This Section provides a brief
overview of class action waivers and the current judicial stance toward
them.

44. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The Use of Non-JudicialProcedures to Resolve Employment
DiscriminationClaims, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 141, 158 (2001) ("Fair arbitral procedures can
provide a more expeditious and less expensive alternative that may benefit workers more than
judicial proceedings."); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OH. ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563 (2001)
("In a world without employment arbitration... we would essentially have a 'cadillac' system for
the few and a 'rickshaw' system for the many.").
45. See David Sherwyn et al., supra note 43, at 147.
46. See Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1634; see also Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of
Process:JudicialRegulation of Consumer ArbitrationAgreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 90-93
(arguing that mandatory arbitration lowers consumer prices because competition forces
businesses to pass cost savings on to consumers). But see Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J.
Jensen, Mandatory Arbitration: Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions:
Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring
2004, at 75, 93 (suggesting that Ware's argument that companies pass on all savings to
consumers is based upon "oversimplified" economic assumptions).
47. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Under Assault: Trial Lawyers Lead the Charge,
POL'Y ANALYSIS, Apr. 18, 2002, at 8, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa433.pdf (last
visited Sept. 2, 2006) ("What opponents of so-called mandatory arbitration really oppose is
freedom of contract.").
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A. Debate Over Class Action Waivers
Though many courts have emphasized that class action
proceedings are important for helping make possible suits that would
otherwise be logistically or economically impossible, 48 credit card
companies, banks, health care providers, and other corporate
defendants usually dislike class actions. Many of these corporations
have found ways to avoid class actions through the use of mandatory
arbitration agreements 49 and, more recently, through class action
waivers. 50 Class action waivers began to emerge in the late 1990s,
when trade-journal articles first started encouraging corporations to
consider
including class action prohibitions
in arbitration
agreements. 51 Companies now frequently use arbitration clauses in
their agreements with customers or other counterparties to manage
52
class action risks.
Companies' use of class action waivers is motivated by the view
that plaintiffs exploit the class action procedure in order to wrest large
and unfair settlements from defendants. 53 This view is particularly
prominent with respect to defendants involved with mass tort claims,
securities fraud claims, and consumer claims, especially under federal
laws that provide for statutory and/or treble damages, attorney's fees,
and costs. 5 4 Class action waivers are viewed by these companies as a
way "to defend themselves" from consumers who are "ganging up on"
companies through the leverage inherent in the aggregation of large
numbers of claims. 55 In further support of these waivers, corporations
argue that the many (perceived) advantages of arbitration to a
48. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).
49. See, e.g., Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16
FRANCHISE L.J. 141, 142 (1997) (encouraging franchisors to make use of mandatory arbitration
provisions); Michael R. Pennington, Every Health Insurer's Litigation Nightmare: A Case Study
of How One Class Action Affected the Business of One Insurer, THE BRIEF, Summer 1999, at 47,

52 (noting that Alabama insurance companies are using binding arbitration clauses in an "effort
to limit litigation exposure in general, and exposure to class actions in particular"); J.T.
Westermeir, How Arbitration Clauses Can Help Avoid Class Action Damages, 14 COMPUTER L.
STRATEGIST, Sept. 1997, at 1 (discussing computer manufacturers' use of arbitration clauses).
50. See Sternlight, supra note 10, at 6 n.5 (citing various arbitration clauses prohibiting
class actions including clauses used by MBNA, American Express, J.C. Penney & Monogram
Credit Card Bank of Georgia, and H&R Block).
51. Gilles, supra note 1, at 396.
52. See Dunham, supra note 49, at 141.
53. See Sternlight, supra note 10, at 5.
54. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2006) (provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act providing
for statutory damages, attorney's fees, costs, and punitive damages for "willful" violations of the
Act).
55. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, But Who's the Predator?Banks Can Use
Arbitration Clausesas a Defense, Bus. L. TODAY, May-June 1998, at 24.
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plaintiff make up for any disadvantages or inconveniences that the
plaintiff may incur by sacrificing the ability to be part of a class
action.
Predictably, both consumer and employee advocates have
expressed strong opposition to corporations' use of class action
waivers. 56 Opponents of class action waivers contend that the ability
to aggregate claims is crucial to protect the rights of those
individuals-employees, consumers, minorities, medical patients, and
the like-who do not have the resources to litigate individual claims. 57
Further, many individual claims are only viable if brought on a classwide basis. 58 Indeed, by prohibiting class actions in the context of
"negative-value" lawsuits, where the expected recovery is dwarfed by
the cost of litigating or arbitrating the claim, individuals are
effectively prevented from pursuing their claims. As a result,
businesses are able to engage in unchecked market misbehavior that
results in small and seemingly insignificant consequences upon
individuals, but which leads to sizeable windfalls for the particular
59
corporation in the aggregate.
B. CurrentJudicial Stance Toward Class Action Waivers
Despite this opposition, class action waivers are increasingly
common, as illustrated by a number of recent cases. 60 For example, in
Discover Bank v. Superior Court,6 1 consumers challenged the
lawfulness of Discover's payment schedule whereby, unknown to

56. This opposition is especially unsurprising in the context of consumer cases, since no
other area of law besides securities cases generates more class actions. Gilles, supra note 1, at
414.
57. See Sternlight, supra note 10, at 12.
58. See, e.g., Med Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 19-20 (Ala. 1998) (plaintiffs argued
that individual damages were too small for individuals to warrant the payment of a $500
arbitration fee).
59. See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =789704 (last visited Sept. 2,
2006).
60. See, e.g., Tsadilas v. Providian Nat'l Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004);
Johnson v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., No. 603101/02, 2004 WL 413213, at *4-8 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 2004); Ranieri v.Bell Atl. Mobile, Inc., 759 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (N.Y. App Div.
2003). Courts in Utah similarly favor agreements to arbitrate. See, e.g., Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v.
Parkwest Assocs., 40 P.3d 599, 606 (Utah 2002); Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d
356, 358 (Utah 1992). Federal courts have also not hesitated to enforce arbitration agreements
that precluded class action relief. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400
F.3d 868, 877 (11th Cir. 2005); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 244 F.3d 814, 819 (11th
Cir. 2001); In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 385, 400 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
61. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
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consumers, payments not credited by 1 p.m. on the bill's due date were
considered late and subjected to a $29.00 late fee plus finance
charges. 62 However, because amendment provisions in the card
member agreements both required all claims to be arbitrated and
prohibited consumers from proceeding on a class wide basis, 63
Discover customers were all but prevented from bringing their claims
since, individually, the $29.00 amount in controversy would likely not
justify the expense of arbitration.
Employers are also increasingly using class action waivers in
the context of discrimination and disability claims. Title VII cases
have long "typified the sort of civil rights action that courts and
commentators describe as uniquely suited to resolution by class action
litigation." 64 Such claims have long been subject to mandatory
arbitration agreements. 65 More recently, employers have begun
incorporating class action waivers into these arbitration clauses to try
to shield themselves from aggregated claims. For example, Circuit
City has imposed class action waivers on its employees to minimize its
exposure to discrimination and other types of employment-related
claims.66
While the potential reach of these class action waivers is
uncertain, at least one leading scholar predicts that these waivers
have the potential effectively to eliminate class actions brought under
consumer and employment statutes. 67 Regardless of whether this
prediction proves true, it is not farfetched to suggest that these
provisions will appear in more and more contracts, in light of a
judicial climate largely favorable toward arbitration in general and
class action waivers in particular. Indeed, such a result seems
especially likely in light of recent articles in trade journals advising

62. Id. at 1104.
63. Bellavia v. First USA Bank, No. 02 C 3971, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18907, at *2-3 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 22, 2003).
64. Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L.
REV. 813, 813-14 (2004).
65. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 686, 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)
(compelling arbitration of race and gender discrimination claims brought against a brokerage
firm).
66. Gentry v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790, 791-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), petition for
review granted, 135 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2006).
67. Gilles, supra note 1, at 413; see also Demaine & Hensler, supra note 25, at 56
("Arbitration is no longer the province of sophisticated participants. Instead, individuals
pursuing long-established statutory claims, such as those brought under the federal securities
and antitrust laws, and newer but long-sought civil rights claims, including race, sex, age, and
disability discrimination, may now be forced to arbitrate if the parties are deemed to have
assented to a pre-dispute arbitration clause.").
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companies to include class action waivers in arbitration agreements. 68
Further, even companies that have already formed contracts with
consumers are perfectly able to include modifications to those
contracts, including class action waiver provisions, in mail inserts and
the like. Thus, in the absence of significant practical restraints,
companies predictably will continue to seek to use class action waivers
in their contractual relationships with consumers, employees, and
other counterparties that they interact with on an aggregate basis.
III. UNCONSCIONABILITY AS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF CLASS
ACTION WAIVERS
In an effort to protect consumers, employees, and other groups
from the potential unfairness of class action waivers in mandatory
arbitration agreements, certain courts have looked to state-law
doctrines of unconscionability. After providing a brief overview of the
doctrine of unconscionability, this Part assesses the viability of that
doctrine as a cure for the problems posed by mandatory class action
waivers and concludes that the doctrine fails to capture the most
pertinent objections to class action waivers.
A. Judicial Efforts to Use Unconscionabilityto Prevent Class Action
Waivers
1. Overview of the Unconscionability Doctrine
The doctrine of unconscionability is a defense to the
enforceability of contracts at common law that exists in all American
state and territorial jurisdictions.6 9 Traditionally, to determine
whether or not a contract provision is unconscionable, courts test the
provision
at issue
for both
procedural
and
substantive
unconscionability. 70 Typically, a contract provision must fail both
prongs of this test to be found unconscionable. 7 1 When policing a
68. See, e.g., Hilary B. Miller, Drafting a Bulletproof Arbitration Agreement (and Donning
Your Flak Jacket), 1362 PLI/CORP 159, 163 (Mar.-May 2003) (detailing how lawyers can use
arbitration clauses as "front-line defense[s] against class actions").
69. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (1981).
70. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal.
2000) ("[Unconscionability has both a procedural and substantive element, the former focusing
on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or onesided results.").
71. See id. ('The prevailing view is that procedural and substantive unconscionability must
both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or
clause under the doctrine of unconscionability."). Occasionally, a contract provision has been
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contract provision for procedural unconscionability, courts focus on the
72
bargaining conditions under which the contract was made. Most
often, problems with the bargaining process are found when the
contract at issue is one of adhesion-that is, one offered on a "take-itor-leave it" basis. If the terms of that adhesive contract, however, are
substantively fair, courts generally tolerate a fair amount of
procedural unconscionability. 73 Courts consider many factors when
evaluating procedural unconscionability, including the clarity with
which the terms are set forth, 74 the clarity with which the effect of
those terms is explained, 75 and the equality (or lack thereof) of the
76
bargaining power between the contracting parties.
When evaluating a contract provision for substantive
unconscionability, courts typically focus on the "oppressiveness" or
"gross one-sidedness" of the contract terms. A contract term is often
considered "oppressive" if it unfairly allocates risk to one party or if
the contents of the term could not be said to fall within one party's
reasonable expectations. Courts also look at "the commercial
reasonableness of the contract term [and] the purpose and effect of the
found unconscionable after failing only one prong of the test. See, e.g., Ball v. SFX Broad., 165 F.
Supp. 2d 230, 240 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that an arbitration clause providing for a forum with
excessively high fees is impermissible in a consumer transaction with a relatively small amount
in issue); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (same); Sho-Pro
of Ind., Inc. v. Brown, 585 N.E.2d 1357, 1361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that gross
excessiveness of price-"oppressive" as a matter of substantive unconscionability-is itself
unconscionable); Ahern v. Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787, 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (same); see also
Margaret M. Harding, The Redefinition ofArbitrationby Those with Superior BargainingPower,
1999 UTAH L. REV. 857, 934 (1999) ("[Clourts have suggested... a large amount of one type of
unconscionability can make up for only a small amount of the other.").
72. Joshua S. Lipshutz, The Court's Implicit Roadmap: Charting the Prudent Course at the
Juncture of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Lawsuits, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1677, 1694 (2005).
73. See Jonathan E. Breckenridge, Bargaining Unfairness and Agreements to Arbitrate:
Judicial and Legislative Application of Contract Defenses to ArbitrationAgreements, 1991 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 925, 979 (1993).
74. See, e.g., Bell v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts are unenforceable unless they "appear in
clear and unmistakable form by highlighting, bold type, or with an opportunity for specific
acknowledgment by initialing"), depublished by S040252, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 4258, at *1 (Cal. July
28, 1994).
75. See Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions:A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 304
(1995) ("Even if arbitration contracts are in bold-faced type, they may be vulnerable to a
procedural unconscionability attack on the grounds that the contract fails to adequately explain
the arbitration procedure and what the consumer is surrendering.").
76. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981) ("[G]ross inequality
of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may
confirm indications that the transaction involved elements of deception or compulsion, or may
show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact
assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.").
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terms. '77 For better or worse, 78 the vagueness of this two-prong
standard provides courts with a fair amount of leeway in making
unconscionability determinations in particular circumstances.
As mentioned in Part I above, FAA § 2 requires courts to
enforce arbitration agreements "save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 79 The Supreme
Court has specifically held that this "saving clause" means that
"generally applicable contract defenses, such as... unconscionability,
may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without
contravening" the FAA. 80 In other words, due to this "saving clause,"
federal law favors enforcement of agreements according to their terms
insofar as-but only insofar as-those terms are enforceable as a
matter of generally applicable state contract law. States may not
single out arbitration provisions for suspect status, but must place
such provisions "upon the same footing as other contracts."8' Because
most other defenses to contract enforcement (fraud, duress) are rarely
pertinent, the "saving clause" of the FAA means that the
unconscionability doctrine-and little else-remains a potential sword
with which to attack class action waivers.
2. Unconscionability Doctrine and Class Action Waivers
The majority of courts faced with class action waivers have
upheld their validity against claims that they are unconscionable. The
85
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third,8 2 Fourth,8 3 Fifth,8 4 and Seventh
77. NEC Tech., Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1996).
78. Some scholars have suggested that unconscionability is simply so flexible a concept that
it permits too much post-hoc judicial interference with contracts. See, e.g., Arthur A. Leff,
Unconscionabilty and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L.
REV. 349, 353 (1970) (arguing that the unconscionability doctrine should not be used as an adhoc judicial remedy but may be effective as a regulatory mechanism imposed by legislatures or
administrative agencies). But see generally M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability,78
YALE L.J. 757 (1969).
79. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
80. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); see also Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483-484 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 226 (1987).
81. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974).
82. See Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 27 F. App'x. 82, 84 (3d. Cir. 2002) (stating that
because "the right to a class action ... is 'merely procedural' and 'may be waived,' an arbitration
agreement barring class wide relief for claims brought under the TIILA is not unconscionable").
83. See Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, Inc., 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002) ("We
also reject Snowden's argument that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable because
without the class action vehicle, she will be unable to maintain her legal representation given
the small amount of her individual damages.").
84. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 176 (5th Cir. 2004).
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Circuits all have enforced class action waivers in consumer contracts.
Many district courts have also upheld the validity of these class action
waivers,8 6 rejecting plaintiffs' claims that such provisions are
unconscionable or contrary to public policy. Notwithstanding the
majority view, however, certain courts-including state courts in
California and Illinois, as well as the Ninth Circuit-have refused to
8 7
enforce class action waivers, finding them unconscionable.
85.

See Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The arbitration

agreement . . . explicitly precludes . . . class claims or . . . 'class action arbitration,' so we are

therefore 'obliged to enforce the type of arbitration to which these parties agreed, which does not
include arbitration on a class basis."' (citation omitted)).
86. See, e.g., Schiefley v. Discover Bank, No. CV 03-2801 RBL, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Wash.
June 25, 2004) (enforcing a class action waiver, stating that, pursuant to a choice-of-law
provision in the contract, "Delaware has clearly and recently determined that the inclusion of a
class action prohibition is not unconscionable, and is enforceable"); Gipson v. Cross Country
Bank, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1262-63 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that a class
action waiver was unconscionable, noting that under the Fair Credit Billing Act-the statute
under which plaintiffs' cause of action arose-the bank would be liable to pay plaintiffs'
attorney's fees and costs if plaintiffs prevailed in arbitration, and, thus, plaintiffs and counsel
had incentive to proceed on an individual basis despite the small monetary value of individual
claim); Tsadilas v. Providian Nat'l Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (affirming
lower court's holding that a contractual waiver of the right to pursue a class action is not
unconscionable); Rosen v. SCIL, LLC, 799 N.E.2d 488, 494, 496 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (reversing the
trial court's finding that a class action waiver was unconscionable, reasoning that, even though
plaintiffs individual claims were small, the plaintiffs arbitration fee ($125) was not
unreasonable, that there was no limitation on his ability to vindicate substantive statutory
rights under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (including
recovery of punitive damages and attorneys' fees) should he prevail, and that, since the
arbitration agreement was added to the credit card agreement through change of terms
procedures, "[i]f plaintiff did not wish to agree to the new terms . . . he simply should have
stopped using the card").
87. See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Under
California law, provision of arbitration agreement prohibiting consolidation of employee claims
and generally prohibiting class-action arbitrations was substantively unconscionable, inasmuch
as provision operated solely to advantage of employer."); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr.
2d 862, 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a class action prohibition in a credit card consumer
contract was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, emphasizing the "manifest
one-sidedness" of the provision and noting that the clause was intended to preclude customers
with small claims from obtaining relief, thereby providing Discover with "virtual immunity" from
class actions); see also ACORN v. Household Int'l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170-71 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (holding a class action prohibition unconscionable on the same grounds set forth in Szetela
and rejecting defendants' argument that Szetela only applies in jurisdictions that accept arbitral
class actions); Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175-76 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding a
class action waiver unconscionable and rejecting defendants' argument that the FAA preempted
the court's unconscionability finding); Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(holding particular provisions of an arbitration agreement unconscionable, including a clause
prohibiting class actions, noting that "[iut would not have been economically feasible to pursue
the claims in these cases on an individual basis, whether ...in court or in arbitration," and that
"the lawyers who represented the plaintiffs in these cases [would not] have taken them if the
only claim they could have pursued was the claim of the individual plaintiff'); State ex rel.
Dunlap v. Berer, 567 S.E.2d 265, 278 (W. Va. 2002) (finding a class action waiver unconscionable
in a contract for jewelry insurance, reasoning that the waiver effectively gave companies
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The Illinois Appellate Court's decision in Kinkel v. Cingular
Wireless, LLC 88 is one of the most recent to apply the doctrine of
unconscionability to a class action waiver and is a good illustration of
the reasoning of similar cases. In Kinkel, the court declared a class
action waiver provision in a wireless telephone arbitration agreement
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.8 9 The court based
its holding of procedural unconscionability on the grounds that the
provision was written in extremely small type, was contained in a
contract of adhesion, and was "hidden" in the middle of an extensive
"terms and conditions" page. 90 As a matter of substantive
unconscionability, the court stated that the cost of filing either in
court or before an arbitral body, combined with costs incurred in
presenting the claim (including lost wages) would offset a "significant
portion" of the plaintiffs maximum recovery (here, a $150.00
cancellation fee). 91 Significantly, the court in Kinkel rejected
defendant's argument that a class action proceeding would undermine
or eliminate the benefits of streamlined arbitration, noting that it
would be more efficient to proceed with a class arbitration than to
decide the plaintiffs claim among thousands of other duplicative
claims. 92 In sum, the court in Kinkel refused to enforce the class action
waiver on the ground that such waivers (1) would effectively prevent
plaintiffs with low-value claims from bringing those claims and (2)
would provide defendants with virtual immunity from liability, class93
wide or otherwise.
immunity to commit illegal acts when the $8.46 added to plaintiffs jewelry purchase was
"precisely the sort of small-dollar/high volume (alleged) illegality that class action claims and
remedies are effective at addressing"); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 828 N.E.2d 812, 819-21
(Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (denying Cingular's motion to compel arbitration, finding unconscionable a
class action waiver because it effectively prevented plaintiffs from bringing claims regarding
early termination fees and because it rendered the contract unreasonably one-sided); Powertel,
Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Bankr. Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding a class action waiver
unconscionable, reasoning that class litigation provided the most economically feasible remedy
for the kind of claim asserted; namely, one involving relatively small sums of money on an
individual basis).
88. 828 N.E.2d 812.
89. Id. at 819-21.
90. Id. at 819.
91. Id. at 820. Significantly, the court first distinguished Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 793 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), noting that in the latter, the arbitration clause provided
that the creditor would advance any arbitration fees the consumer had to pay. Kinkel, 828
N.E.2d at 820. The court also distinguished Rosen, 799 N.E.2d 488, stating that, in Rosen, the
arbitration clause provided that the creditor would advance the amount of any arbitration fees to
the consumer that exceeded what he would have to pay for court fees. Kinkel, 828 N.E.2d at 82223.
92. Kinkel, 828 N.E.2d at 820.
93. Id. at 820-821 (citing Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002)).
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Notwithstanding the fact that the majority of courts uphold
class action waivers against a claim of unconscionability, these
minority decisions are of considerable practical significance insofar as
they permit class proceedings on behalf of a nationwide class of
consumers or employees to take place in the minority forum, or insofar
as they enable, at the very least, consumers in larger states (e.g.,
California, Illinois, and Florida) to sue rather than arbitrate. 94 Indeed,
the dissent in the California Supreme Court's decision in Discover
Bank expressed concern that California would become a "magnet"
jurisdiction for plaintiffs' lawyers. 95 Thus, even these minority
decisions have, for practical purposes, meant that class action waivers
are susceptible to invalidation under state-law unconscionability
doctrine.
B. Efforts to Avoid the Effect of the UnconscionabilityDoctrine
Because some courts have found class action waivers
unconscionable, defendants have adopted a variety of legal strategies
designed to circumvent such results. In particular, defendants have
attempted to use choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses and to
invoke FAA preemption as means of preserving class action waivers.
None of these strategies, however, has offered a guaranteed way to
avoid the minority view that class action waivers in arbitration
clauses are invalid under state unconscionability doctrine.
1. Choice-of-Law and Forum-Selection Clauses
Defendants
have
attempted
to
avoid
unfavorable
unconscionability findings by including choice-of-law and forumselection clauses in their arbitration agreements. Such measures have
met with mixed success. For example, on remand from the California
Supreme Court in Discover Bank, the California Court of Appeals for
the Second District enforced a Delaware choice-of-law provision in the
arbitration agreement, reasoning that California's policy interest in

94. See Samuel Isaacharoff & Catherine Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization:Grappling with
the "Risk to the Rest of the Country" 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006) (addressing the question of
what happens when an aberrant state's "experimentation" poses a "risk to the rest of the
country").
95. Discover Bank v. Superior Court (Discover Bank), 113 P.3d 1100, 1118 (Cal. 2005)
(Baxter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[If California courts must, or may,
dishonor class action waivers that are perfectly valid under the governing law selected by the
parties themselves, California - which now takes a minority position on this issue - might well
become the magnet for countless nationwide consumer class action lawsuits that could not be
maintained elsewhere.").
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striking down certain class action waivers as unconscionable did not
outweigh the state of Delaware's interest in the application of its
96
policies, which did not consider class action waivers unconscionable.
In contrast, however, the California Appeals Court in another case,
Szetela v. Discover Bank,97 found unconscionable a class action waiver
notwithstanding the presence of a choice-of-law provision, stating that
Discover had failed to establish that the law of Delaware should apply
in that case. 98 As these decisions make clear, including a choice-of-law
provision does not guarantee that a defendant can entirely avoid the
application of an expansive unconscionability doctrine under state
law.
Though one might believe a simple response to this problem
would be to insert a forum-selection clause in addition to a choice-oflaw provision, this strategy, too, is far from foolproof. For example, in
America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court,99 a California appellate court
permitted class proceedings brought under the California Consumers
Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), despite the presence of both forumselection and choice-of-law provisions designating Virginia as
providing the governing law and chosen forum. 10 0 The court reasoned
that both the forum-selection and the choice-of-law clauses were
unenforceable because to hold otherwise "would necessitate a waiver
of the statutory remedies of the CLRA, in violation of that law's antiwaiver provision and California public policy." 10 ' Significantly, the
court noted that "[t]he unavailability of class action relief in this
context [was] sufficient in and of itself to preclude enforcement of the
forum-selection clause."10 2 Thus, while including such provisions in
arbitration agreements certainly increases the chance that the chosen
law and forum will apply, courts have deemed such clauses to be
unenforceable precisely because they are designed to circumvent the
minority of cases holding that class action waivers are unconscionable
due to the fact that they effectively prevent plaintiffs from pursuing
their claims.

96.
(Cal. Ct.
97.
98.
99.

Discover Bank v. Superior Court (Discover Bank Remand), 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456, 461-62
App. 2005).
Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866 n.3.
Id.
108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 701-02 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).

100. Id. at 701.
101. Id.

102. Id.
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FAA Preemption Arguments

In addition to choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses,
defendants have used preemption under the FAA as an argument
against the use of the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate class
action waivers. As noted earlier, FAA § 2 requires courts to enforce
arbitration agreements "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 103 Specifically, the Supreme
Court in Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Casarotto0 4 explained that
"generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements without contravening [FAA] § 2.. . ."105 Defendants have
argued, however, that the invalidation of class action waivers under
state unconscionability law crosses the line between the application of
"ordinary principles of unconscionability"
and implementing
substantive state policies in order to attack specifically arbitration
clauses. 10 6 When courts are faced with a policy decision between class
action litigation or individual arbitration of claims, these proponents
contend, the FAA explicitly sets forth that arbitration should
presumptively prevail as long as the parties actually chose to submit
to arbitration.10 7 Proponents of FAA preemption thus argue that
courts have impermissibly used the "unconscionability label"1 08 not as
a means of policing the bona fides of the parties' voluntary agreement,
but rather to enforce substantive state policies of "discouraging unfair
and unlawful business practices," "creating a mechanism for a
representative to seek relief on behalf of the general public," and
"promot[ing] judicial economy and streamlin[ing] the litigation process
in appropriate cases. 10 9
Nevertheless, FAA preemption is not a foolproof argument, as
cases such as Discover Bank have held, citing FAA § 2, that the FAA
103. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
104. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
105. Id. at 686-87.
106. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, The Gold Rush of 2002: California Courts Lure
Plaintiffs' Lawyers (But Undermine the Federal Arbitration Act) By Refusing to Enforce "NoClass Action" Clauses in Consumer ArbitrationAgreements, 58 BUS. LAW 1289, 1294-95 (2003).
107. Id. at 1296; see also STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 58 (2001)
("[Tlhe United States Supreme Court surely would review state courts' unconscionability rulings
to the extent necessary to prevent the unconscionability doctrine from effectively nullifying the
FAA with respect to a huge class of contracts. Indeed, the Court has twice stated that state
courts may not 'rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect
what.., the state legislature cannot."' (citing Casarotto,517 U.S. at 687 n.3)).
108. Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 106, at 1295.
109. Id.
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does not federalize the law of unconscionability and thus leaves states
free to apply that doctrine to invalidate arbitration agreements as
they would any other contract. 110 The Ninth Circuit and various other
federal courts have also rejected the argument that California's
application of the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate class action
waivers is preempted by the FAA.11 1 Thus, the preemptive force of the
FAA does not preclude the minority view that class action waivers are
unconscionable from having important practical effects.
C. Evaluating Unconscionabilityas a Mechanism for PolicingClass
Action Waivers
As discussed above, a minority of courts have-with important
practical effects-used state-law unconscionability doctrine as a
weapon against class action waivers. These courts have resorted to the
unconscionability doctrine primarily due to the fact that § 2 of the
FAA expressly preserves state law defenses to contract enforcement.
Nevertheless, state-law unconscionability doctrine is a highly
imperfect and conceptually unsatisfactory antidote to the problem
posed by class action waivers. Ultimately, the unconscionability
doctrine simply does not capture fully the problems raised by class
action waivers because of its singular focus on the "fairness" of the
bargain to individual claimants.
In order to evaluate the unconscionability doctrine as a defense
against class action waivers, it is important to recall the two primary
rationales underlying those decisions which have held class action
waivers unconscionable. As discussed above, the doctrine focuses on
two types of "unfairness": procedural unfairness in the bargaining
process and substantive unfairness in the terms of the resulting
contract. A contract may be deemed "oppressive" if it is "grossly onesided" both in the bargaining power of the respective parties and in
the benefits and burdens allocated to each party by the agreement.
This question of "oppressive in relation to whom" is important
in evaluating whether the unconscionability doctrine is an effective
means for getting at the concerns underlying class action waivers. At
its core, the unconscionability doctrine is concerned with individual

110. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court (Discover Bank), 113 P.3d 1100, 1112 (Cal. 2005)
(holding that nothing in the FAA "prohibit[s] a California court from refusing to enforce a class
action waiver that is unconscionable ... ").
111. See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 n.15 (2003); see also Janda v.
T-Mobile USA, No. C 05-03729 JSW, 2006 WL 708936, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2006) (following
Ingle); Laster v. T-Mobile USA, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192 (S.D. Cal. 2005) ("[T]he holding of
Discover Bank is not preempted by § 2 of the FAA.").
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bargains and individual contracts. However, this focus on unfairness
to individuals does not adequately reflect concerns about class action
waivers, especially in the most problematic context-namely,
negative-value suits. Indeed, when claims are of minimal value, even
a contract that prospectively waives the right to pursue such claims
altogether is difficult to describe as "oppressive" to each individual
claimant.
Moreover, when claims are of minimal importance to each
individual, alternative enforcement mechanisms may be sufficient to
alleviate unfairness. In the context of employment contracts, for
example, even if an individual is, in all practicality, economically
prevented from pursuing her claim herself, the prospect of agency
enforcement is often available. For example, employees with
discrimination claims may file charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and other enforcement agencies,
even if they have signed predispute arbitration agreements. 112 If the
claimant seeks equitable relief, the EEOC is at least theoretically a
viable option, and this prospect-as imperfect as it is-could be said to
counter the "oppressiveness" of relinquishing an individual claim for
minimal damages.
Largely because many individual claims (especially in the
context of consumer contracts) are worth so little money, it is simply
not the case that the courts' sole concern is that each and every
potential claimant receives his or her own meager recovery. Rather, as
the district court in Johnson v. West Suburban Bank'1 3 asserted, an
additional and essential reason for skepticism of class action waivers
is that "the class action device is necessary to ensure meaningful
deterrence to creditors who might violate the acts." 1 4 This articulates
courts' equally important concern with class action waivers: the
inability of a large group of plaintiffs to pursue their claims will
effectively give defendants immunity from liability under the law,
thus allowing these defendants to continue their (allegedly) illegal
conduct unchecked. With no check on the actions of corporations,
many worry that these defendants will have the ability to cause
arguably "slight" harm to countless individuals, to cause massive
harm in the aggregate, and sometimes to get quite rich in the
process. 1 5 Viewed with a focus on the result of the imposition of
112. Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1373 (1997).
113. 82 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D. Del. 1999), rev'd, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000).
114. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d at 368-69 (involving a class action waiver in an action
brought under the Truth in Lending Act).
115. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 1, at 430.
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numerous class action waivers, these provisions lead to one-sided
results favoring defendants, but they probably do not rise to an
unconscionable level of "oppressiveness" with regard to any particular
individual. A defendant cannot gain large wealth because one
individual was prevented from bringing claims; similarly, a defendant
cannot enjoy "immunity" from discrimination claims, for example, by
including a class action waiver in one employment contract. Rather,
these waivers only seem to cause "oppressive," "one-sided" results in
the aggregate. As a preliminary observation, the unconscionability
doctrine seems largely inadequate to address this concern about class
action waivers.
Indeed, focusing on the results of class action waivers in the
aggregate presents at least two problems for an unconscionability
analysis. First, application of the unconscionability doctrine involves
an assessment of an individual contract ex ante, not ex post. 116 The
concern about corporate misbehavior shifts the doctrinal focus from
"oppressiveness" at the time of the contract's formation (ex ante) to
"oppressiveness" in the form of unchecked corporate misbehavior as
an effect or result of individual parties' practical inability to bring
claims (ex post). This reveals that the concern about corporate
deterrence
is mismatched
with
the primary
concern of
oppressiveness-namely, the perceived harm to individual consumers.
Second, and perhaps more troubling for one attempting to
characterize a class action waiver as "oppressive" and therefore
unreasonably "one-sided," is the notion that much of the havoc
wreaked by these provisions occurs not at an individual level, but
rather, in the aggregate. Indeed, if the concern of courts is the unjust
enrichment and immunity gained by defendant corporations, such
gains only occur, to any significant degree, in the aggregate. As an
illustration, if only one or two (or even ten or twenty) individuals are
prevented from bringing claims, the amount of money gained and the
amount of litigation avoided by corporations likely will be as negligible
as the value of the low-yield claims. Thus, as to each individual
contract, a class action waiver is not unfairly "one-sided" in favor of
the corporation, since the corporation gains very little in such a case.
The corporation only receives monetary gains if it successfully imposes
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) ("If a contract or term thereof is
unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the
application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result."); U.C.C. § 2302(1) (1998) ("If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made .... "); id. cmt. 1 ("The basic test [for
unconscionability] is whether ... the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.").
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class action waivers on a large majority of its customers; similarly, the
corporation only attains large-scale immunity if it imposes these
provisions on a majority of its consumers or its employees. Thus, if the
class action waiver is only unfairly one-sided in the aggregate, it can
only be challenged, to any meaningful degree, in the aggregate.Viewed
this way, unconscionability, as a doctrine that evaluates an individual
contract's fairness ex ante, is an inadequate tool with which to deal
with this concern.
IV. BEYOND UNCONSCIONABILITY: CLASS ACTION WAIVERS,
MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, AND THE VINDICATION OF
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
As discussed above, unconscionability is not the most
appropriate doctrinal basis for ensuring the availability of aggregate
procedures. It is far from apparent that the concern about defendants'
unjust enrichment and immunity from civil law enforcement
constitutes the type of gross "one-sidedness" that the doctrine of
unconscionability is designed to remedy. Accordingly, only a few
courts have held that class action waivers are so "oppressive" as to be
considered unconscionable. At bottom, the unconscionability doctrine
seems wholly inapt to address the fundamental concerns about these
class action waivers. The real question is not whether class action
waivers are the product of unfairly lopsided bargaining in each
individual arbitration agreement. Rather, the core concern about class
action waivers is whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the class action waiver and non-waivable substantive rights such that
these waivers should not be left to private bargaining. This Section
directly addresses this question and argues that the implicit
assumptions underlying the FAA's liberal pro-arbitration policy
warrant invalidation of class action waivers in cases where they
effectively preclude the vindication of substantive rights.
A. Key Assumptions Behind the FAA's "LiberalPolicy" in Favor of
Arbitration

In its decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, the
Supreme Court established that the FAA created a "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary." 117 Invoking this

117. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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"liberal policy," courts have tended to uphold class action waivers in
mandatory arbitration agreements. 118 These courts have largely failed
to recognize, however, that this "liberal policy" favoring arbitration
rests on two important assumptions that are essential to its
justification: (1) mandatory arbitration agreements merely move
dispute resolution between private parties from a judicial to an
arbitral forum, and (2) arbitration confers benefits to both parties to a
dispute in the form of more efficient and cost-effective procedures.
Class action waivers undermine these central assumptions-and
should therefore not be subject to the generous federal policy toward
arbitration agreements-in situations where they abridge plaintiffs'
ability to pursue their claims in any meaningful way.
1. Assumption # 1: Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Merely Move
Dispute Resolution From a Judicial Forum to an Arbitral Forum
While recognizing that the FAA creates a "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements," the Supreme Court has nonetheless
repeatedly stressed in cases beginning with Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.119 that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial forum." 120 This has been a central assumption in the Supreme
Court's arbitration jurisprudence at least since the Court abandoned
the "old judicial hostility" toward arbitration agreements that was
expressed in prior decisions such as Wilko. 121 Under the Court's
current pro-arbitration policy, while arbitration provides an
alternative means of resolving disputes, 122 the switch from courtroom
litigation to private arbitration presumptively does not abridge the
statutorily conferred private rights of consumers, employees, and
other plaintiffs. As the Court stated in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc., 12 3 "[t]o the extent that Wilko rested

118. See, e.g., West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d at 366.
119. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
120. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
123 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989). See also Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc.,
415 F.3d 364, 372 (4th Cir. 2005) ("An agreement to arbitrate preserves the claim; the agreement
simply shifts the forum for resolving the claim from a court to an arbitration setting.").
121. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. at 480 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v.
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
122. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 20 ("While arbitration focuses on specific
disputes between the parties involved, so does judicial resolution of claims .
.
123. 490 U.S. 477.
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on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections
afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen
far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal
124
statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."
The Supreme Court's presumption that arbitration does not
fundamentally abridge the remedies available under applicable law is
constrained, however, by practical realities. Although federal law
creates a presumption that arbitration does not constitute a "method
of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to wouldbe complainants,"' 125 even the Court recognized in Shearson/American
Express that the enforceability of an arbitration agreement that
abolished "essential features" of the remedial regime would be subject
to serious doubt. 126 Indeed, the Court in Shearson/American Express
reassured itself, citing Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Wilko, that
"[t]here [wa]s nothing in the record before us, nor in the facts of which
we can take judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitral system...
127
would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is entitled."
In upholding arbitration clauses in other contexts, lower
courts have also reassured themselves that the arbitral process is
sufficient to vindicate private rights. 128 While courts should not
assume that every deviation from the normal procedures of civil
litigation is fundamental, the implication of the Supreme Court's
Mitsubishi assumption is that corporations and other entities should
not be able to use a procedural vehicle, no matter how otherwise
favored, to obliterate a party's ability to pursue the resolution of his
claims altogether. Because a key justification for mandatory
arbitration is that the switch from a courtroom to an arbitral forum
still leaves intact an effective alternative means of enforcing private
rights, a provision-such as a class action waiver-that completely
eliminates any effective means of relief, leaving in place a system in
which the only viable enforcement mechanism remaining is a public
one, violates the Court's Mitsubishi assumption and thus falls outside
the Court's pro-arbitration policy.

124. Id. at 481.
125. Id.
126. Id ("[T]he right to select the judicial forum and the wider choice of courts are not such
essential features of the Securities Act that § 14 is properly construed to bar any waiver of these
provisions.").
127. Id. at 483.
128. See, e.g., Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 681 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting
that the purposes of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act "can be
fully realized through arbitration").
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Assumption # 2: Arbitration Confers Benefits on Plaintiffs and
Defendants

Another related assumption behind the "liberal policy" favoring
arbitration is that the arbitral forum provides some benefit to both
parties, not merely in the form of cost savings, but also in the form of a
more efficient, knowledgeable, and private decisionmaking process for
pursuing their claims.129 Supreme Court precedent is rife with
references to the "advantages of arbitration" in the form of a more
streamlined, less cumbersome, and less costly process for resolving
private disputes. 130 As the Supreme Court stated in Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams,1 31 in which the FAA's pro-arbitration policy was
extended to employment contracts, "[a]rbitration agreements allow
parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of
particular importance in employment litigation, which often involves
smaller sums of money than disputes concerning commercial
contracts." 132 The premise behind the Supreme Court's view of
arbitration as "beneficial" is that the arbitral process is an efficacious
method of resolving disputes and generates efficiencies and cost
savings (as compared to the litigation process) that redound to the
benefit of both parties.
This assumption behind the favorable policy toward mandatory
arbitration is undermined entirely, however, when a mandatory
arbitration provision is combined with a class action waiver that
renders parties unable, in practicality, from bringing claims at all. In
such situations, a plaintiff never benefits from any arguable cost
savings or efficiencies of arbitration. Indeed, a plaintiff, because of the
class action waiver, cannot effectively bring his claim in either dispute
resolution forum. Further, any non-monetary benefits derived from
pursuing claims in the arbitral forum (for example, efficiency,
expertise, or privacy) are not actually realized by those individuals
who cannot bring claims. Thus, while such "benefits" provide a key
rationale for permitting mandatory arbitration, this rationale
crumbles in the presence of a class action waiver that prevents parties
from bringing claims.

129. See generally Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration
Agreements, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251 (2006) (contending that the benefits of arbitration outweigh the
burdens of class action waivers).
130. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001).
131. 532 U.S. 105.
132. Id. at 132; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 634 (1985) (noting the "strong belief in the efficacy of arbitral procedures for the resolution
of international disputes").

1764

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:5:1735

B. Toward a New FederalPolicy on Class Action Waivers That
Compromise Substantive Rights
At bottom, the core concern with class action waivers in the
context of mandatory arbitration is that class action waivers prevent
certain plaintiffs-namely, those with claims that are not
economically viable on an individual basis-from "effectively
vindicating" their statutory rights. This core concern finds support in
the Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi, in which the Court
expressed the view that federal statutory claims may only be
arbitrated if "the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his or
her statutory cause in the arbitral forum." 13 3 It also accords with
Supreme Court precedent holding that federal statutory rights, such
as those under Title VII, cannot prospectively be waived. 134 The
rationale behind the Mitsubishi standard is that arbitration provisions
that effectively prevent a plaintiff from bringing his claims are, for
practical purposes, no different from a waiver of otherwise unwaivable
rights that should not be permitted even as a matter of private
bargaining.
Lower courts have repeatedly applied the Mitsubishi standard
in assessing the enforceability of particular arbitration agreements. In
Cole v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services,13 5 for example, the D.C.
Circuit applied Mitsubishi and held that an employee could be
compelled to arbitrate his Title VII claim because the arbitration
agreement in that case:
(1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3)
requires a written award, (4) provides for all types of relief that would otherwise be
available in court, and (5) does not require to pay either unreasonable costs or any
arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum. 136

Likewise, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, held in Morrison v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. 137 that "[t]he Supreme Court has made clear
that statutory rights ... may be subject to mandatory arbitration only
if the arbitral forum permits the effective vindication of those
1 38
rights."

133. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 635); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28
(1991) (same); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240 (1987) (same).
134. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
135. 105 F.3d 1465, 1479-83 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
136. Id. at 1482.
137. 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
138. Id. at 658.
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The Supreme Court has only once elaborated on the standard
for assessing whether a particular arbitration provision prevents a
plaintiff from "effectively vindicating" her statutory rights. In Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph,139 the Court stated that an
arbitration agreement might pose such an obstacle if it forces the
plaintiff to assume financial burdens so prohibitive as to "deter the
bringing of claims."' 40 The Court stated that "[i]t may well be that the
existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as
Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in
the arbitral forum."'' The Court refused to invalidate the arbitration
agreement on that basis, however, because the record did not establish
1 42
that the plaintiff would "bear such costs if she goes to arbitration."'
Nevertheless, the Court in Randolph firmly established the
proposition that a plaintiff may successfully challenge the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement if it can bear "the burden of
showing the likelihood of incurring such costs" that would make
143
arbitration "prohibitively expensive."
The Randolph holding has significant implications for the
future treatment of class action waivers. Indeed, the crux of the
problem with class action waivers in the context of negative-value
claims is that proceeding with an individual arbitration is
"prohibitively expensive" in light of the small value of the claim. Only
through aggregate procedures can a plaintiff "effectively vindicate" her
individual rights. Indeed, as the Supreme Court stated in Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 44 "The policy at the very core of the class
action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
prosecuting his or her rights."'14 5 Thus, under Randolph, a plaintiff
should be able to defeat a class action waiver (even if he concedes that
the ability to engage in a class action is a procedural and waivable
right) by arguing that the waiver of that right in a particular case
prohibits him as a practical and economical matter from being able to
46
vindicate a substantive federal statutory right.
139. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
140. Id. at 90.
141. Id.
142. Id.

143. Id.
144. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).

145. Id. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
146. Gilles, supra note 1, at 406; see also Roger J. Perlstadt, The Timing of InstitutionalBias
Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1983, 1995 (2002) ("The treatment of statutory
rights is different because of the public interest in the resolution of disputes over statutory rights
- an interest that is separate from private parties' interest in resolving a dispute between
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Whether this argument against class action waivers will find
traction in federal courts remains an open question. The initial
reception by the lower courts was muted. 147 A recent First Circuit case
suggests, however, that courts may ultimately be receptive to
invalidating class action waivers on these grounds. In Kristian v.
Comcast, Inc.,148 the First Circuit was faced with an arbitration
agreement in a cable television subscription agreement that barred
Boston-area cable subscribers from bringing any form of class-wide
arbitration (in that case, alleging antitrust violations and other
anticompetitive practices). The court of appeals first noted that under
its prior precedents interpreting Mitsubishi, "the legitimacy of the
arbitral forum rests on 'the presumption that arbitration provides a
fair and adequate mechanism for enforcing statutory rights.' ",149
Although it noted that the class action device is "a procedure for
redressing claims-and not a substantive or statutory right in and of
itself," it nevertheless refused to "ignore the substantive implications
of this procedural mechanism. ' 150 Rather, it credited expert evidence
presented by plaintiffs that, due especially to the expense and
complexity of antitrust litigation, "without some form of class
mechanism-be it class action or class arbitration-a consumer
antitrust plaintiff will not sue at all."'1 51 In light of this reality, the
court struck down the class arbitration waiver, on the grounds that
"Comcast [would] be essentially shielded from private consumer
antitrust enforcement liability, even in cases where it has violated the
law"; "Plaintiffs [would] be unable to vindicate their statutory rights";
and "the social goals of federal and state antitrust laws [would] be
themselves. In order for these rights to be submitted to arbitration, the arbitration must allow
effective vindication of them. Any arbitration of a statutory claim that did not allow for effective
vindication of rights would 'conflict[ I with the statute's purpose of both providing individual
relief and generally deterring unlawful conduct through the enforcement of its provisions."'
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
147. In the immediate aftermath of Randolph, a line of lower court cases upheld the
enforceability of arbitration clauses under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) despite the fact that
they precluded class wide relief. See Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir.
2003); Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002); Randolph v.
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 244 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. West Suburban Bank,
225 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2000).
148. 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
149. Id. at 54 (quoting Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1,
14 (1st Cir. 1999)).
150. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 54.
151. Id. at 58; see also id. at 54-55 ("The class mechanism ban - 'particularly its implicit ban
on spreading across multiple plaintiffs the costs of experts, depositions, neutrals' fees, and other
disbursements' - forces the putative class member 'to assume financial burdens so prohibitive as
to deter the bringing of claims. ...

And these costs ...

seeking."' (quoting Gilles, supranote 1, at 407)).

will exceed the value of the recovery she is
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frustrated because of the 'enforcement gap' created by the de facto
liability shield." 152 Although it remains relatively untested, the First
Circuit's rationale in Kristian is a far more promising-and
doctrinally appropriate-tool against class action waivers in the
context of negative-value claims than the unconscionability arguments
153
adopted by other courts.
C. Which Rights?: Refining the Scope of the Mitsubishi Standard
One critical question remains. In its evolving jurisprudence on
the enforceability of arbitration clauses, the Supreme Court has
always been particularly concerned about arbitration agreements that
affect claims arising under federal law. Indeed, in each case that it has
expressed a concern about the "effective vindication" of rights through
arbitration, the Supreme Court was faced with claims arising under
federal statutes. 154 Moreover, even those justices who have dissented
from the Court's broad application of the liberal policy favoring
arbitration have focused on a "distinction between statutory rights
and contractual rights."155 Even under the most expansive reading of
Mitsubishi and Randolph, the Supreme Court's concern appears to be
limited to the effective vindication of federal statutory rights.
In light of the core concern regarding class action waivers, as
well as the assumptions underlying the "liberal policy" favoring
arbitration, any rigid, categorical distinction among types of claims is
misplaced. As discussed above, the core concern with class action

152. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 61. The court also distinguished the Third Circuit's decision in
Johnson as well as its progeny, which had rejected the assertion that class-wide proceedings are
necessary for the effective vindication of rights under the TILA. Antitrust claims, the court
noted, are far more costly and complicated to litigate than relatively straightforward claims
about a particular financial transaction. Id. at 57-58.
153. Another case soon to test this theory is currently underway in New York, in which
various small retailers seek class treatment for antitrust claims against American Express,
arguing that the cost of proving liability will run well into the hundreds of thousands of dollars,
while the median small merchant stands to gain, at most, $5,200. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration at 14, In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig.,
No. 03 Civ. 9592 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2003) (arguing that "expert witness fess and other
out-of-pocket costs that are necessarily incurred in a case of this nature, exclusive of class related
expenses, are at least $1 million," while the median "small merchant plaintiff incurred $1,751 in
actual damages during the four year statutory period, or $5,252 in treble damages").
154. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (considering the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (considering the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240 (1987) (considering
the Securities Exchange Act and RICO); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) (considering the Sherman Act).
155. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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waivers is that in a certain set of cases, the inability to proceed on a
class-wide basis would both deprive individual plaintiffs of their right
to recovery and allow defendants to engage in illegal activities
unchecked. Moreover, a fundamental assumption of the courts' proarbitration gloss on the FAA is that the referral of a claim to
arbitration does not effectively deprive the plaintiff of a meaningful
ability to pursue her claims. Neither of these justifications depends
fundamentally on the substantive or jurisdictional nature of the
claims that the plaintiff seeks to pursue. Whether the claim arises
under federal or state law, or sounds in contract or tort, the basic and
correct insight behind Mitsubishi and Randolph is that class action
waivers ought not to be enforceable if class-wide proceedings are
necessary to the effective vindication of individual claims under
applicable law.
As the First Circuit properly recognized in Kristian, whether a
class action waiver should be enforced under the FAA depends
critically on whether individual claims would be economically and
practically feasible in the absence of a class action mechanism. This
requires a basic two-step inquiry. First, as a threshold matter, courts
should ask whether the claims at issue are amenable to class
treatment. Indeed, the class action device is only a suitable means for
aggregating claims if they meet the requirements of numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequate representation under Rule 23,
156
given the particular facts and legal issues presented in the case.
With regard to employment discrimination, for example, in 1977 the
Supreme Court recognized that "suits alleging racial or ethnic
discrimination are often by their nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs." 157 If, however, the class certification claim is weak-for
example, because individual issues predominate over common onesthen presumptively a waiver of the right to proceed via class-wide
litigation is not seriously prejudicial to the plaintiffs. Similarly, if the
particular state or federal statute that gives rise to the claim contains
a specific restriction on the availability of class-based relief in the first
instance, then the class waiver may not represent the curtailment of a
158
significant right.

156. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
157. E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977).
158. See, e.g., Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 374 (3d. Cir. 2000) ('The sums
available in recovery to individual plaintiffs are not automatically increased by use of the class
forum. Indeed, individual plaintiff recoveries available in a class action may be lower than those
possible in individual suits because the recovery available under TILA's statutory cap on class
recoveries is spread over the entire class.").
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Second, and more crucially, courts should inquire whether the
prospective individual recovery is sufficiently large in light of the
totality of the costs of litigation to incentivize plaintiffs and plaintiffs'
attorneys to bring an individual action. In other words, would an
individual claim realistically be brought in the absence of a class
action mechanism? The cost of pursuing different types of claims will
vary widely depending on how fact-intensive and legally complex they
are. 159 Statutory provisions providing for costs, attorneys' fees, and
statutory damages may offset the otherwise applicable costs of
litigation, but the inherent uncertainty of success means that such
recovery will never in itself be sufficient incentive for lawyers to
pursue such claims. 160 Simply put, in most cases an individual claim
will not be brought even with such provisions if the value of the claim
is minimal. 161 If, after this two-step inquiry, a court concludes that an
arbitration provision prohibiting a class proceeding would cause a
potential plaintiff not to pursue even the most clearly meritorious of
claims, the appropriate application of the Mitsubishi and Randolph
standards would be to preclude the enforcement of that provision
under the FAA.
CONCLUSION

As commercial relationships become more and more complex,
corporations increasingly incorporate class action waivers and
mandatory arbitration agreements into their contracts with
consumers, employees, and others. Given the frequency of these
commercial interactions, and the bargaining power of corporations,
these provisions usually are included in contracts of adhesion. Courts
have thus far struggled to develop an appropriate doctrinal basis to
grapple with the problem caused by these provisions. Arguments
rooted in state law unconscionability have largely been unsuccessful
and even where they have been adopted, have proven conceptually
inapt. Rather, the central question of whether to enforce these waivers
raises fundamental inquiries about just how closely the class action
device is intertwined with substantive rights. In order to address the
concerns articulated by many courts in response to class action
waivers-namely, concerns for the protection of individual claimants
and for the deterrence of corporate wrongdoing-arbitration
159. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 58 (1st Cir. 2006).
160. See id. at 59 n.21.
161. See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The
realistic alternative to a class action is not 17,000,000 individual suits, but zero individual suits,
as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.00.").
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provisions that effectively compromise substantive rights should not
be enforceable under the FAA. The Supreme Court's decisions in
Mitsubishi and Randolph should therefore be adopted to preclude
enforcement of class action waivers where such waivers have the
practical effect of extinguishing individual claims.
J. Maria Glover*
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